Additional Context
Actors
Payer/Payee (banks, dealers, buy-side) · Stablecoin Issuer/Admin · Execution Venue · Post‑trade/Market Infrastructure (custody/CSD/clearing) · Regulator/Auditor · Compliance/Monitoring · Custodians/Prime Brokers · Oracles/Reference Data
Problems
Problem 1: Payment Privacy with Regulatory Compliance
Public-by-default ledgers leak strategy and order flow and conflict with institutional confidentiality and compliance obligations. Institutions need stakeholder-only visibility with selective disclosure and atomic settlement with assets.
Problem 2: User Onboarding & Fiat Integration
Institutions need practical paths to onboard their users (corporates, funds, counterparties) onto private stablecoin infrastructure. This includes integrating with existing fiat rails, compliance workflows, and ensuring users can move between fiat and private tokens seamlessly.
Requirements:
- Must hide: transfer amounts, payer/payee identities to non-participants, and memos/workflow metadata; optionally timing/ordering leakage minimised
- Public OK: existence of a transaction/anchor; contract code; allow-list membership proofs (no PII); attestation schemas
- Regulator access: scoped viewing keys and/or attestations with access logging; revocation & rotation policies
- Settlement: Atomic DvP/PvP across cash↔asset or cash↔cash using ERC‑7573 semantics; minutes‑level finality OK for pilot
- Ops: predictable L2 costs; encrypted audit log with L1 anchors; issuer controls (freeze/blacklist) where mandated; KYC holder gating (e.g., ERC‑3643)
Constraints:
- Performance: Throughput/latency/finality must be measured on chosen Ethereum stack (no reliance on vendor claims)
- Regulatory: Must not weaken KYC/AML/sanctions, reporting, or books‑and‑records per local jurisdiction requirements
- Interoperability: Avoid vendor lock‑in; standardised APIs/bridges; production migration path
Recommended Approaches
See detailed solution architecture and trade-offs in Approach: Private Payments.
Jurisdiction-Specific Implementations:
- China: Apply these patterns to e-CNY (Digital Yuan) infrastructure through approved BSN channels
- EU/US: Licensed stablecoins under MiCA/GENIUS frameworks
- Hong Kong: SFC-licensed digital payment token services
Non‑Solutions
- Public ledger without privacy — transaction details exposed to all observers; fails institutional confidentiality requirements
- Simple payload encryption — breaks on-chain verifiability, atomic settlement, and composability with other protocols
- HTLC-only atomicity — incentive misalignment and timeout brittleness compared to conditional settlement standards like ERC‑7573 (analysis)
- Fully private infrastructure — conflicts with regulatory transparency requirements and limits interoperability
- FHE alone for unlinkability — provides confidentiality but does not hide address linkage; requires additional privacy layer (stealth addresses or similar)
Open Questions
- Minimum viable privacy set (amounts+counterparties only vs timestamps/order flow)?
- Regulator access model (who, what scope, revocation path, SLAs)?
- Custody→token binding and settlement finality sensing across domains?
- L1 anchoring cadence and metadata leakage analysis
Notes And Links
- Standards & Infrastructure: ERC‑7573 · ERC‑3643 · ERC‑5564 Stealth Addresses · Aztec · Zama fhEVM · Fhenix
- Regulatory Frameworks (jurisdiction-specific): see jurisdiction
- Technical Note on Privacy: FHE implementations (Fhenix, Zama fhEVM) encrypt data-in-use providing confidentiality but not unlinkability. To hide address linkage and prevent transaction graph analysis, combine with ERC-5564 Stealth Addresses or equivalent unlinkability mechanisms.
Related patterns
- Stateless Plasma Privacy — Onboarding privacy via client-side proving
- TEE-Based Privacy — Issuer-side private minting
- Private Stablecoin Shielded Payments
- Private PvP Settlement
- DvP via ERC-7573
- L2 Encrypted Offchain Audit