Additional Context
Actors
Institutions (banks, trading firms, asset managers) · RPC Providers · Node Operators · MEV Searchers · Regulators
Problems
Problem 1: Competitive Intelligence Leakage from Blockchain Reads
Institutions querying blockchain state reveal their interests and positions. RPC providers, node operators, and network observers can infer trading strategies from query patterns.
Requirements:
- Must hide: Query source (which institution is asking), query targets (which addresses/contracts), query timing and frequency patterns
- Public OK: Aggregated network statistics; general query volume
- Regulator access: Audit trail of institutional queries for compliance; selective disclosure mechanisms
Constraints:
- Latency requirements for trading applications
- Many institutions do not run own infrastructure
- MEV protection increasingly critical
Problem 2: MEV Extraction from Read Patterns
Query patterns preceding transactions enable MEV extraction. Knowing what an institution is looking at reveals imminent trades.
Requirements:
- Must hide: Pre-transaction query activity; address monitoring patterns
- Public OK: General blockchain state (post-query)
- Regulator access: Query logs for market surveillance
Constraints:
- Real-time trading requirements
- Integration with existing trading infrastructure
Recommended Approaches
Approach TBD. Consider:
- Private RPC services with query obfuscation
- Query batching and timing randomization
- Institution-run infrastructure where feasible
Open Questions
- What's the threat model: RPC provider, network observer, or both?
- How do private reads integrate with private transactions end-to-end?
- Cost/latency trade-offs for different privacy levels?
Notes And Links
- Cross-cutting concern: affects all use cases where institutions read blockchain state
- Related: Private Oracles (data feed query privacy)
- RFP: RFP-private-reads