Works best when
- You want machine-readable bond terms and lifecycle events across tools.
- Multiple issuance platforms need to interoperate without bespoke mappings.
Avoid when
- A jurisdiction or domain mandates a different canonical schema.
Post-quantum exposure
Risk · low- Vector
- Hash-based anchoring is not directly affected. Any ECDSA-signed off-chain attestations over BDT records are vulnerable to a CRQC, but the canonical schema itself has no cryptographic dependency.
- Mitigation
- Use post-quantum signatures for attestations over BDT records; hash-based commitments for on-chain anchoring remain safe.
Components
- Canonical schema defines bond terms (identifiers, parties, cash flows, covenants) and lifecycle events (issuance, coupons, redemption, restructuring).
- Schema validator checks that bond records conform to the canonical definitions before they are signed, hashed, or anchored.
- Compression layer converts verbose representations (for example XML) into binary or compact serialization for efficient on-chain anchoring.
- Registrar integration maps internal registrar records to the canonical schema so existing systems can emit conformant data without rewriting their back office.
- Attestation anchor posts hashes of conformant records to an on-chain attestation registry so any verifier can check that a disclosed document matches what the registrar recorded.
Protocol
- operator Author bond terms and lifecycle events in the canonical schema.
- operator Validate the record against the schema and compress for storage.
- operator Store the record (on-chain hash anchor, off-chain canonical payload).
- auditor Use the same schema when preparing selective-disclosure proofs or attestations.
- regulator Verify consistency between disclosed payloads and on-chain hash anchors.
Guarantees & threat model
Guarantees:
- Interoperable, regulator-friendly bond data across platforms.
- Easier proofs and attestations over common fields without bespoke per-issuer schemas.
- Clean baseline for composing with hash-anchored registries and zero-knowledge disclosure patterns.
Threat model:
- Schema governance integrity. If the standards body publishes conflicting revisions, validators may diverge on what counts as conformant.
- Registrar mapping correctness. A mismapping at integration time can silently break consistency between internal records and canonical output.
- Out of scope: data confidentiality. The schema is a structural artifact, not a privacy tool; confidentiality must come from accompanying patterns (hash anchoring, selective disclosure, ZK proofs).
Trade-offs
- Up-front mapping effort is required to wire existing registrar systems into the canonical schema.
- Schema extensions for new product types (complex derivatives, non-standard covenants) need standards-body involvement, which can lag market innovation.
- Not a privacy mechanism on its own. Must be paired with hashing, attestation, or zero-knowledge patterns to protect the underlying data.
Example
An issuance platform publishes bond terms in the canonical schema. The registrar validates the record and anchors its hash via an on-chain attestation registry. A regulator later receives the full payload off-chain and verifies the hash matches the on-chain anchor, confirming the record has not been altered since issuance.